The Computational Principles of Learning Ability by Wu, Hao







It has been quite a long time since artificial intelligence (AI) researchers in the field of computer
science have stopped talking about simulating human intelligence or trying to explain how the brain
works. Recently, represented by deep learning techniques, the field of machine learning has been ex-
periencing unprecedented prosperity and some applications with near human-level performance bring
researchers confidence to imply that their approaches are the promising candidates for understanding
the mechanism of the human brain[1][2]. However apart from several ancient philological criteria and
some imaginary black box tests (Turing test, Chinese room) there is no computational explanation,
definition or criteria about intelligence or any of its components. Based on the common sense that
learning ability is one critical component of intelligence and from the viewpoint of mapping relations,
this paper presents two laws which explain what “learning ability" is, as we familiar with it and under
what conditions a model can be acknowledged as a “learning model". Furthermore, corresponding
corollaries prove the existence of a common learning model (L), and by comparing with traditional
learning theory with the theoretical framework proposed in this dissertation, the author explains why
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The field of “AI” as being widely mentioned today is generally held to have started at the conference in July
1956 when the term “Artificial Intelligence” was first being used, two main approaches were developed
since then. Based on the belief that intelligence is fundamentally related to neuronal and synaptic activity
[3][4], the “Bottom Up” approach looked at the neuron level and worked up to try to create higher
level functions, in other words, they were studying the fundamental mechanism of intelligence. The
“Top Down” approaches focus on higher level functions of intelligence and trying to implement those.
Before 1980’s, many industry and academic fields researchers believed that it would not take too long to
create artificial system which could simulate human intelligence. Therefore large amount of money was
invested into this field and several programs and methodologies were developed, such as “Virtual Mall
1952”[5], “Geometry Theorem Prover 1958”[6], “General Problem Solver 1959”[7], “Eliza 1966”[8] an
early example of primitive natural language processing program, and “Deep Blue 1997” the most famous
expert system, however, this once great promise of bringing real artificial intelligence to public leads to
nowhere but inevitable futility and researchers in this filed had avoided using this tarnished term “artificial
intelligence (AI)" during the AI winter.
Actually, started from early 1970’s, some scientists[9] were beginning to realise that creating real
intelligence might be much more complicated than their first thought. After 1980’s, bottom-up approaches
were abandoned by most AI researchers in the field of computer science, therefore instead of emphasising
on the ability to simulate human intelligence, software and algorithms developed by computer scientists
now work as a kind of support of different applications, this methodology is known as machine learning
techniques, more specifically, machine learning techniques are being developed as means for satisfying
the demand of different disciplines other than an ultimate purpose: simulating intelligence on computer
system.
The classic definition of machine learning can be summarised as:
Being capable to use experience to improve the behaviour of the computer system.[10]
This operational definition is different from previous definition of AI areas, so the question "Can machines
think" be replaced with the question "Can machines do what we can do?". Because machine learning
techniques are now being used to identify common problems of many different subjects that needs
to be addressed urgently, so it has become a highly interdisciplinary area which combines studies of
artificial intelligence, probability and statistics, neurobiology, cognitive science, information theory,
cybernetics, computational complexity theory, philosophy and other disciplines. And it has demonstrated
significant practical value in many fields such as data mining, speech recognition, image recognition, robot,
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automatic vehicle driving, bio-informatics, information security, remote sensing information processing,
computational finance and industrial process control.
Recently, due to the great success of Deep Learning Techniques, Artificial Intelligence (AI) becomes a hot
topic again. Deep Learning researchers imply that the question about “How Brain Works" can be partially
explained by their approaches. However, except for many philosophical discussions and the famous black
box test “Turing test”, there is no clear definition of intelligence and it is well accepted that the ability
of “thinking” is difficult to define[11]. On the other hand, for machine learning researchers and artificial
intelligence experts, once a problem is solved, the solution as a computational model, seems to have
nothing to do with intelligence, it seems like only a problem to be solved is related to the understanding
of intelligences[12]. Therefore, researchers are trapped in a paradox as shown in figure 1.1.
Figure 1.1: Paradox of AI effect. Problems solved by human, there is no doubt that we are intelligent.
Problems solved by machine, there is no doubt that machine is not intelligent because we know exactly
how it works.
Since all possible automated solutions implemented by computer systems are basically different computa-
tional models[13], it seems like there will be no computational model which could be acknowledged as
possessing true intelligence forever. One possible solution of breaking this paradox is to find one or a set
of criteria which can be used for white box testing of all computational models, as shown in figure 1.2.
Figure 1.2: White box criteria for Intelligent Models
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Instead of giving criteria for intelligences, based on the understanding that the learning ability is a critical
component of intelligence, this dissertation proposes two laws for a computational model to be a learning
model. With the help of these two laws, computational models can be classified as “Learning Model" and
“Non-Learning Model" (figure 1.3), these two laws also provide a computational explanation about what
the “Learning Ability" is.
Figure 1.3: White box criterion for Learning model
1.1 Structure of this dissertation
This dissertation based on the belief that "There is no observation independent reality", and author’s
explanation of this notion is " the existence of different concepts are the result of learning, it is not
eligible to assume the existence of any concept before learning", or in other words " learning is the ability
to define different concepts ". The same conclusion could be draw from an intuitive deduction of the
"NO-FREE-LUNCH" theorem.
A general-purpose universal optimization strategy is theoretically impossible, and the only way
one strategy can outperform another is if it is specialized to the objective function"[14][15].
In our daily life, there are many intuitive examples which reflect the notion of NFL theorem. Normally,
we use coffee grinder to make coffee not juice extractor, we would like to wear soccer shoes while playing
football not slippers, and paratroopers are equipped with parachute not umbrella. The fact that specific
task requires specific solution is the most common knowledge which we take it for granted, and all
these solutions are basically specialized optimization strategy for specific objective function. The most
important fact is that in every using case of all specific strategies, there is an inevitable component: us.
We identify the objective requirements, we decide or design what strategy will be used, and we cooperate
with all kinds of strategies designed by us. We are drivers, we are pilots, we are captains and we are
astronauts, the best way to guarantee the well functioning of a system is to integrate us with the task
specific solution, because we are the inevitable core part and ultimate information source which support
every specific strategy under exceptional circumstances, we are the general purpose universal optimization
strategy. Therefore, does the existence of us disprove the NFL-theorem?
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Assume that there is an universal optimization strategy Z, then the only reasonable explanation is
that there is not any specific "objective function" exists before Z is being implemented, furthermore
the existences of all "specialized objective function" are products of implementing Z, once learned the
existences of different specialized object functions, it is possible for Z to draw the conclusion that the only
way one strategy can outperform another is if it is specialized to the objective function. More specifically,
we are this optimization strategy Z, we define the existence of all objective functions and based on that we
could get the conclusion of NFL-theorem. This interpretation supports the "Single algorithm" assumption
of neuroscience, actually readers will notice that three hypothesises regarding the primate neocortex[16]
will be uniformly explained as coherent parts of the theoretical framework proposed in this dissertation.
In the next chapter, an introduction of traditional learning theory will be given and by carefully analysing
from the view point which has been missed by previous researchers, two issues of traditionally learning
theory will arise, and these two issues directly lead to two corresponding laws which can be used to
verify whether a model possess the learning ability as we intuitively familiar with. In chapter three, five
definitions will be given, these definition not only necessary for the following discussion but also convey
the author’s interpretation view point which is very important for understanding this dissertation. In
chapter four, two laws will be introduced in detailed, and one central conclusion is that different concepts





For any machine learning problem, one of the most important assumptions is that patterns exist in our
observation. Expressing our observation as a pair < X,Y >, then a pattern is g : X → Y , and X is the
input space, usually a d dimensional subset of Rd, where Y the output space is a subset of real number.
Therefore the domain X ×Y contains all possible observation results and the pattern is a relation between
X and Y . In a classification problem, Y is also known as the indicator set.
Machine learning is essential when people are interested in knowing the relation between X and Y , but
cannot observe every possible element (x, y) of the domain X × Y nor know the precise mathematical
expression of g. Therefore all machine learning approaches can only depend on two kinds of information
that we do know.
• Our limited observation of the domain X × Y : (x1, y1),(x2, y2),(x3, y3)...(xm, ym) denoted as
< X,Y >seen.
• A hypothesis set about the relation between Xseen and Yseen, denoted as H = f(x, y,Θ), which is
usually called a model.
Each candidate of the hypothesis set is distinguished by a unique k dimensional parameter θ ∈ Θ, and the
ultimate goal of all machine learning algorithms is to pick one hypothesis θt and hopefully this f(x, y; θt)
could approximate the target unknown pattern g better than any other candidate in the hypothesis set1, or in
other words we hope f(x, y, θt) could generalise the unseen part < X,Y >unseen 2 with highest accuracy.
However, since the target pattern g is unknown and there will always be a future observation which has not
been seen yet in every machine learning problem, how could people possibly know whether a hypothesis
f(x, y; θ1) possesses higher generalisation accuracy than any another hypothesis f(x, y; θ2)? For example,
in a binary classification problem B, there are always at least two functions from either the same or
different hypothesis sets which could behave exactly the same on the observation set < X,Y >seen yet
behave differently on the unseen set< X,Y >unseen. Actually, the no-free-lunch(NFL) theorem indicates
that the average accuracy of implying machine learning techniques against all possible hypothesis sets on
B is no better than a random guess [17].
1when the unknown pattern is a binary function, it is usually called a concept, and our corresponding hypothesis set is
mentioned as concept class or class of concepts
2We assume that the set of unseen part is always non-empty.
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2.1 PAC Learning
PAC learning indicates that the NFL theorem does not necessary mean the immediate doom of machine
learning.
Assume our observation of an unknown pattern g is < X,Y >seen= (x1, y1), (x2, y2), ..., (xm, ym), and
we have a finite hypothesis set H = h1, h2, ..., hn. Then we could define Error(h) as follows:
Error(h) = Prob{g(x) 6= h(x)} (2.1)
Based on our observation we obtain Error(h)seen, which is usually referred to as a training error, while
the error of future observation Error(h)unseen which is usually referred to as Off-Training-Set Error
(OTS error) remains unknown; PAC learning shows that the differences () of these two errors is bounded
as follows:
Prob[|Error(h)seen − Error(h)unseen| > ] ≤ 2|H|e−22m (2.2)
Where |H| is the size of the hypothesis set, h is the hypothesis which best fit our observation, m is
the number of observations, is the upper bound of the tolerance, and once the difference between
Error(h)seen and Error(h)unseen is bigger than this tolerance we could say that Error(h)seen has lost
track of Error(h)unseen.
Instead of trying to approximate g with some h ∈ H directly, Inequation 2.2 shows that it is possible
to approximate the error we cannot observe (Error(h)unseen) using the error that can be observed
(Error(h)seen). The only thing left to do is to minimise the training error, so that we can guarantee that h
will generalise the unknown target g with great accuracy. However there is a trade-off between minimising
the training error and increasing the chance that our observation (Errorseen) would keep tracking what
cannot be observed (Errorunseen).
Intuitively, as shown in Inequation (2.2) the bigger the hypothesis set we have, the larger chance that we
could find an h with an even smaller training error. However a more sophisticated model would require
more observations; otherwise, the error we can see Error(h)seen could easily lose track of the error that
cannot be seen Error(h)unseen. This situation is usually referred to as over-fitting.
2.2 Shattering Effect and VC Dimension
In previous section we assume that the size of our hypothesis is finite, and |H| = ∞ means there will
be no guarantee that what can be observed (Errorseen) will keep track of what cannot be observed
(Errorunseen) and learning in this case is infeasible. However, in the real world, the size of most
frequently used real number parameter hypotheses is infinite. It would seem hopeless to implement
machine learning techniques based on these infinite size hypothesises.
Instead of focusing on the exact size of a given hypothesis set, the idea of shattering is to try to analyse the
effective behaviour of a given hypothesis set quantitatively. Assume C(x,Θ) is a concept class mapping
from the input space X into {-1,+1}, so that C is said to be able to shatter X′ ⊆ X if every possible
mapping relation gˆ′ : Xˆ′ → {−1,+1} can be computed by a concept x→ c(x; θ ∈ Θ) in the concept
class C, and the VC dimension of the concept class C is the size of the largest possible Xˆ′ . More
precisely, if the VC dimension of the concept class C is m, then the largest size of gˆ′ will be 2m.
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The idea behind the shattering effect is straightforward, even though a concept class C could contain
infinite concepts defined by an infinite set Θ, what really matters is their behaviour. A million different
concepts could behave as effectively the same as one concept, as shown in Figure 2.1. In Picture A, there
are infinitely many hypotheses which are all able to separate dots from crosses, and in Picture B there
is only one hypothesis which separates dots from crosses. Therefore, it is reasonable to assert that this
infinite number of hypotheses behave as if there is only one hypothesis.
Figure 2.1: Infinitly many hypothesis versus one hypothesis
Therefore, although the size of a hypothesis set could be infinite, it could still behave like a finite size
hypothesis set. By adopting the shattering effect, the effective behaviour of a hypothesis set could be
analysed quantitatively and the mathematical definition of shattering is:
∀g : X′ → {0, 1}∃θ∀x ∈ X′(H(θ, x) = g(x)) (2.3)
In equation 2.3 the number of possible is the VC Dimension of hypothesis set H. In the real world, this
abstract quantity of many infinite hypothesis sets happens to be finite, and it is clear that the concept of
VC dimension is independent from many other concepts of machine learning, such as ’learning algorithm’
, ’unknown pattern’, and ’sampling distribution’. It reveals the intrinsic property of a hypothesis set and
therefore can be used to compare the capacity or representation power of different hypothesis uniformly,
by replacing the size of a hypothesis set with VC dimension, we could rewrite equation (2.2) as follow:
Error(h)unsee ≤ Error(h)seen +
√
[HV C log (2m/HV C) +HV C − log(δ/4)]/m (2.4)
As introduced by [18, p.76], in this new equation, HV C is the VC dimension of hypothesis set H , m
is the number of instance being observed, and equation (2.4) holds with the probability of 1− δ, or in
other words, δ is the chance that our hypothesis will behave badly (Errorseen lose track of Errorunseen).
According to Equation (2.4) we can see that:
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1. Low VC dimension compared to the size of dataset would suggest that Errorseen approximates
Errorunseen with higher accuracy, and larger VC dimension is good for minimising the the error
that can be observed (Errorseen) but bad for generalisation.
2. Infinite VC dimension still means that the learning is infeasible.
3. For keep tracking what cannot be observed, the number of necessary instances of observation are
proportionally increase with the value of the VC dimension. Only when exposed to this large
number of instances, a hypothesis set is said to be able to be generalised the unknown target g with
the probability of (1− δ).
2.3 Traditional Classification Task and Two Issues
In this section, one simple binary pattern classification problem is investigated. The discussion of this
example will not only show how VC dimension can be used to analyse the generalisation ability in practice
but also reveal two important issues about traditional learning theory of classification tasks, and these two
issues will be used to illustrated what is the learning ability. Furthermore, two laws of learning ability
which will be introduced in Chapter 4 correspond to these two issues.
Suppose there is a binary multilayer feed-forward neural network N1 which will compute an unknown
target function:
g1 : R
n → {0, 1} (2.5)
As shown in Figure 2.3, the neural at layer t is the label of g1 which has a binary value {0, 1}.
Figure 2.2: Multilayer feed-forward neural network N1
The activation function of each neuron is a linear threshold activation function:
F = {fW (x) = ρ[w0 + w1x1 + w2x2 + ...+ wnxn] |W ∈ Rn+1}, (2.6)
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The VC dimension of our neural network is V Cdim(N1) = O(nl log n+ nl2) [19]and because a linear
threshold function is a piecewise polynomial function, the VC dimension of N1 is also proportional to
w ˙logw [20], so the VC dimension of N1 is also:Ω(w logw) [21], where w is the number of weights of a
neural network.
A binary classification neural network could be easily extended to handle multiclass classification tasks as
shown in Figure 2.3. Recently by adopting layer-wise pre-training techniques, it is possible for a deep
neural network to generate hierarchical representations of high-dimensional data, and meanwhile preserve
its neighbourhood structure in nonlinear mapping [22]. Therefore, theoretically, in neural network Nd the
neuron g1 could represent the concept of the front image of human[22], the neuron g2 could represent the
concept of a cat[1], and with enough observations of human faces or images of cats, our neural network
Nd could actually learn an unknown concept g1 : Rn(images)→ {0(not− human), 1(human)},
g2 : R
n(images)→ {0(not− cat), 1(cat)}.
4
Figure 2.3: Neural network Nd for multiclass classification task
2.3.1 Two issues
In this section two new terms will briefly be introduced in this dissertation. In the example above, the
neural network Nd must be exposed to enough instance, so that it could generalise the unseen data
with high accuracy. Therefore, we can say that all those instances collectively represent the concept of
humanity, and the output +1 is another representation of humans. The term "concept" in this case means
the existence of humanity which is a distinguishable notion from other species.
At this stage, we could call the set of all instances the local representation of humanity, and +1 in
conjunction with the map the global representation of humanity. Presumably, the unknown pattern that
exists in our observations could always map the local representation (an infinite set) to a single global
representation.
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There is another important assumption of learning theory: the elements x of < X,Y >seen and <
X,Y >unseen are drawn from the same distribution independently. It is apparent, after training, when
being exposed to pictures of pig, dog,cup,etc, that it is impossible to determine the input picture by
observing the output of Nd. In other words, with all these local representations which we human beings
know are from different categories, our modelNd can only offer an indistinguishable global representation.
The differences being contained in the input are lost 3 in the global representation and all these input are
noise with respect to the input that we expect our model to recognise. Currently, classifiers in traditional
learning theory are able to determine what is not expected to be recognised; however all differences among
unexpected inputs are lost This is the counter event issue of traditional learning theory.
If we want the model to be able to recognise dogs or cups or pigs. we would include pictures of these
different categories in our training set, and replace our old hypothesis set Nd with a new one+d and go
over all the training processes again. After the training, we acknowledged that a new model has "learned"
how to recognise these different objects, but is the learning process the same as our ability of learning?
The author assumes the following facts are well accepted by most of people:
• Human beings and some other animals (like dogs) are able to recognise new objects which are
different from all objects we have ever seen.
• We do not need to see a large amount of instances of a new object that we not seen before.
When dealing with classification problems, whenever we need to include a new class in our model, it is
inevitable to construct a new hypothesis set (model) and go over the entire training process all over again.
Different assumptions about the number of categories t expected to be recognised will lead to different
hypothesis sets Ht (t is the number of categories expected to be recognised). In addition, one necessary
condition of reaching the best generalisation performance of a given hypothesis set Ht1 is to implement
Ht1 to a classification problem which is expected to contain t1 different categories.
If a model is assumed able to identify different categories in a domain with great accuracy, it must
be built based on the knowledge about how many categories there are in the training set at the first
place; however if knowledge about differences in the domain can only be gained by implementing
machine learning techniques, then how it would be possible to know how many different categories
there are beforehand? For example, in Figure 2.3.1, the training set contains images of different objects,
outputs are labels that represent different categories, and the necessary information for selecting a model
Ht is the number of labels. In reality, this information is usually being provided by us, the model
creator. Therefore, in summary, machine learning techniques cannot solve randomly selected classification
problems spontaneously.
3The central philosophy of this dissertation is that the differences exist or can be identified only because the global
representations are different; otherwise there is no way for us to know that a picture of pigs is different from a picture of dogs.
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Figure 2.4: Spontaneity issue: the information loop
In the NFL theorem, this conclusion was being summarised as " A general-purpose universal optimisation
strategy is theoretically impossible, and the only way one strategy can outperform another is if it is
specialised to the objective function"[14][15]. Therefore, with respect to human-level ability of learning
which is usually acknowledged as a general purpose learning algorithm, the only possible conclusion is
that there is no such ’objective function’. The existence of a pattern is the result of learning. Because of
the ability of learning, learning models (human beings) should be able to sense the existence of a pattern.
It is the learning ability that brings us the differences of a pattern, not the other way around.
These counter event issue and spontaneity issues are fundamental differences between traditional learning
theory and our intuitive understanding of learning ability. These two issues will lead to Law one and Law
two directly which will be introduced in fully details in chapter 4, before that some formal definitions






When we look outside the window, we could see birds, butterflies, clouds, and trees. When we take a deep
breath, we could taste the sweet smell of the freshly cut grass. Although we have no direct access to the
world other than through our sensors [23], we can always rely on different kinds of apparatus to discover
the world. In fact, all apparatus can be regarded as extension of our biological senses. However what if
something cannot be detected by all means? Is it necessary to insist on its existence? The question has
been answered perfectly by Carl Sagan’s famous story “The Dragon In My Garage”[24]. Discussions in
this dissertation are built based on the belief that:
There is no observation independent reality.
This notion will naturally lead to a hierarchical relation between two representations of a single “existence"
(The meaning of this quotation mark will be revealed soon).
3.2 Global and Local
Imagine there is a world that contains three dice and a sub-world in it. There is only one very narrow
channel between World One and its sub-world, and the inner state of this sub-world can be affected by the
surfaces of these dice through this narrow channel. All these dice have surfaces with six different colours:
R(red), G(green), B(black), P(purple), Y(yellow), and O(orange), the creator of the sub-world and the
dice guarantee that these dice exert their power through the channel by the following rules:
• These three dice will exert their power through the channel one by one.
• The rotation order of die one (D1) and die two (D2) are the same: red->green->black->purple-
>yellow->orange->red->...->orange and repeat.
• Each surface of these dice will be face the channel for a certain amount of time; surfaces with the
same colour as dice one (D1) and dice three (D3) will exert their power with the same proportion of
time.
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• People of the sub-world have no ability to affect anything outside the sub-world, in other words
their behaviour cannot affect states outside the sub-world directly or indirectly1.
Figure 3.1: The relativity between global and local.
• Scenario A
If the sub-world will be affected only by how long each colour is being shown to it, then people
living in this sub-world could have the notion that there are two dice in World One.
• Scenario B
If the sub-world will be affected only by the order of the colour being shown to it, then people
living in this sub-world could also have the notion that there are two dice in World One.
In Scenario A, the differences between D1 and D2 vanished; in Scenario B, the differences between D1
and D3 vanished, and we know that. However, people who live in the sub-world can only be affected by
local effects of the dice on the sub-world, and based on those local effects , the people of the sub-world
learn of the existence of the two dice. Therefore, we can say that local effects in this sub-world collectively
represent the existence of two dice, and so does any distinguishable labels being used by people from
the sub-world to record the existence of these two dice2. The existence of these two dices is indisputable
truth for people of the sub-world, as long as what can be detected by people in the sub-world still follows
either Scenario A or B as introduced above. However, this “truth" can only be verified by people who live
in World One or any world that contains World One, which has the relative global vision with respect
to people in the sub-world3, even though this verification is meaningless for people in the sub-world.
Therefore, with respect to observers in the sub-world, all those local effects collectively represent the
existence of these dice, and the concepts of the existences of two dice (no matter how it is recorded) are
global4 information which could be “wrong" but will affect only global events.
1Actually, our skull is such a sub-world which keep our brain inside, the only difference is we could affect states of the
world which contains our skull.
2Could also be a certain combination of activated neurons in their brains.
3Physicians of the sub-world might want to find a unified field theory which would eventually describe all local effects in
term of one die.
4The term “global" is used in contrast to “local". This usage also reflects a nested relation between World One and the
sub-world. What the sub-world learned from local information can only be verified by the world it is nested in. The result of this
verification could has no effect on it. Most of all, the author’s viewpoint of this relation can be revealed by using these two terms.
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Actually, by inspecting our daily life with a little bit more patience, we can find that global information
and local information appear in pairs very often and almost everywhere. People just take it for granted
most of the time. Here are two examples below:
• Global information: File extensions. Local information: a set of certain schema.
• Global information: DNA. Local information: corresponding environment.
When we write some simple applications, if an interface was designed to process XML files, this means
the implementation of this interface will expect an input file with XML schema. If some file other than
expected was passed to this interface, usually we obtain an some error message and simply modifying the
suffix would not offer any help. There are infinitely many files of different types that could be passed
into this interface, and all their different local information will be lost in a single error message. If a
mammal from the Serengeti national park was somehow brought to Antarctica, the error message would
be "DEATH", all those local information are lost in this single error message as death in here 5.
Especially in software engineering, the more global information being used in coding (known as hard
coding or tight coupling), the less generalisation ability the application will have. As introduced in the file
extension example, one typical solution of making our application behave more smartly is to include a
vast number of exception handlers; however, ironically, this method ultimately needs humans to decide
what exceptions this application can expect to meet6. Now, readers might have realised that when a
student starts learning a new programming language, there is plenty of global information such as the
key words “int", “double", “String", and a student needs to learn their corresponding local information
and the different contexts in which these variables should be used. When a variable is passed to an
unexpected place, we will get the “TypeError" message which is usually the most common error message;
all information contained in that variable cannot be obtained from that “TypeError" message.
Figure 3.2: Error message of hard-coded function and traditional learning theory.
5One may argue that the category of an animal can be identified by inspecting its remains, and therefore all local information
can be recovered completely, such as appearances, habits, and colour of the skin. Try to imagine if this were the remains of an
animal from other planet, could all this local information still be recovered?
6Even though, we could come up with a sophisticated model which could somehow detect whatever schema the input file
could use, how can this model be integrated into an application? Currently, there is only one such sophisticated model: us, and
we are also responsible for creating and adjusting all other applications.
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It is also true that when we extend this concept to natural language, a combination of some marks
known as words are global information with respect to all different kinds of local representations, which
are usually referred as “MEANING". Dictionaries are full of this pairwise information and our daily lives
also relies on this pairwise relation. The word “HOME" would generate feelings of easy and comfortable,
while the word “GRANNY" might mean delicious cookies or strong hugs. It is also true when you
heard these words, global information is just a different combination of sounds, however, they could
carry the same meaning (local information) as corresponding words. When people are learning a foreign
language, one easy task is to remember foreign words of substantial objects because it is just a set of local
information and extra global information.
Figure 3.3: As a substantial existence, it is easy to directly map its English global information to Chinese
global information.
What could be difficult is trying to remember the word of an abstract concept because the corresponding
set of local information may have never been collectively used to represent some concept and therefore
has no single global representation, such as the German word “WALDEINSAMKEIT". There is no single
corresponding word in either Chinese or English that has the same meaning. Worse, the corresponding set
of local information might not even exist in a student’s life, what shown in Figure 3.4 is almost impossible
to translate into English. Learning a foreign language would literatelly brings people a new vision of our
world.
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Figure 3.4: As an abstract existence, it is almost impossible to directly map this Chinese global information
to English global information, even though there are similar activities in the English world; however all
the local information just does not match perfectly.
These intuitive examples not only briefly illustrate the relative global and local relation but also indicate
some intrinsic casual relations between this local and global relation. In the following section, based on
the World One and Sub-world example, five definitions will be given. These definitions not only aim to
express this global and local relation mathematically, but also aim to provide utilities to analyse whether a
model is able to learn, or in other words possesses the ability to always give counter events spontaneously.
3.3 Definition 1
For a given mapping relation M : D → O (D and O are subsets of high-dimensional Euclidean
space), an element in the range ( o ∈ O) is a piece of global information and each element in its
corresponding domain ({e | e ∈ D,M(e) = o}) is local information.
At this stage, this definition means nothing more than giving names to elements of the range and domain
in the image of a mapping relation. Any apparatus used to detect the world can be regarded as a mapping
relation from appearances (subset of apparatus’ domain) to the concept (elements in the range). Biological
systems can also be regarded as one kind of apparatus ,which includes us. A concept could be a substantial
object, such as cat, or an abstract concept, such as gravity or electromagnetic waves.
3.4 Definition 2
For a given mapping relation M : D → O 7, one subset of the domain and each element of the
7In the following sections, all domain and range are subsets of high dimensional Euclidean space
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corresponding subset of the range are local and global representations, which define the same concept
,respectively.
Figure 3.5: Local and global representation. A set of local information is the local representation of a
concept; each global information is one global representation of a concept.
A set of appearances are detected by an apparatus M (the domain of a mapping relation M). These
appearances indicate the existence of a concept, so the local representation of this concept is defined as
the subset X ,and the global representation of this concept is defined as each element of the subset Y.
Therefore, all local information about a concept is its only local representation, and the global information
of the concept is equivalent to its global representation. Furthermore, it is necessary to define local and
global representation in this way because of the hierarchical structure of this global and local expression.
More specifically, it means the existence of a concept depends on its appearances, and this concept itself
could also be one of many appearances that define a higher level concept. This can be explained by a
simple mental experiment.
Imagine sleeping on the backseat of a minivan and the shaking caused by the speed bump wakes you
up. You do not know how long you have slept, and you watch the scenery passing outside the window.
Suddenly, you realise that you are approaching “Some Place". What is included in the passing landscape
depends on appearance. It could be a cottage, church or supermarket. All these rapidly passing views are
appearances which enable you to recognise that you are near this “some place”, and this “some place" is a
higher level concept. Therefore, Definition 2 and Definition 1 should be able to precisely describe all parts
of this hierarchical relationship of different information. Readers might argue that it is redundant to define
global and local relations as Definition 2 and Definition 1. As shown in Figure 3.6, Set A collectively
represents a concept A, so according to Definition 2, Set A is the local representation of Concept A and a
is one global representation of Concept A (Other possible global representations of concept A are not
shown here or there could be only one global representation). And concepts a, b, and c belong to another
Set E which could collectively represent a Concept E, therefore from the viewpoint of the mapping
relation f4, a is a piece of local information and e = f4(a) is a piece of global information (Definition
1) which is also a global representation of Concept E. More intuitively, A could be the appearances
of a cottage, B could be the shake caused by the speed bump, a and b are their global representations,
respectively, and they collectively as E they represent some place e.
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Figure 3.6: The hierarchical structure of local and global. Capital letters mean sets which are different
local representations and its elements are local information.
In summary, Definition 1 and Definition 2 indicate that:
1. These four expressions are equivalent:
A concept≡A set of appearances≡A set of local information (Definition 1)≡A local representation
(Definition 2)
2. These three expressions are equivalent: A concept≡A piece of global information≡A global
representation
3.5 Definition 3
For a given mapping relation M : D → O, it defines the type of global information as M .
As the notion being introduced in Definition 1 is:
There is no observation independent reality
The existence of a certain concepts depends on whether it is observable. Furthermore, the nature of the
concept depends on the method of observation. As shown in Figure 3.6 set E collectively represents a
concept, and the elements of E could be the output of different types of mapping relations f1, f2, and f3.
Intuitively, the phrase "Pepperoni Pizza" (a global representation) means slightly spicy, red colour, Ron
Cooke hub8, and all this local information that collectively represents "pepperoni pizza" contains different
types of information: vision, taste, and even memory.
Definition 3 guarantees that it is the appearances and the way these appearances are processed that decides
not only the existence but also the nature of the concept because the appearances (local information) form
a subset of the domain, and the way this local information is processed (mapping relation) gives the global
representation (global information) of a concept.
Even when facing the same domain, different mapping relations will give different types of information.
One typical example is the camera where the domain is provided by the CCD array. Different functions of
8Not necessarily true for others.
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the camera will give different types of information, such as the focusing information used to adjust the
lens and the information recorded as photos.
3.6 Definition 4
For two given mapping relations: Ml : S1 → S2 and Mh : S3 → S4, if S1 ∪ S2 ⊂ S3 then ∀s ∈ S2 is
homologous global information with respect to Mh.
Figure 3.7: Homologous global Information. Elements of S2 are homologous global information with
respect to the mapping relation Mh.
3.7 Definition 5
i For two given mapping relations: Ml : S1 → S2 and Mh : S3 → S4, if S2 ⊂ S3 then ∀s ∈ S4 is
first order global information with respect to Ml.
Figure 3.8: First order global Information. Elements of S4 are first order global information with respect
to Ml.
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Apparently, all elements in S4 are beyond the field of vision of mapping relation Ml. If Mh has a
one-to-one mapping relation between S2 = S3 and S4, it is also true that all elements in S2 are beyond the
field of vision of mapping relation Ml. Therefore, for a given mapping relation M : D → O, all elements
in its range are first order global information with respect to M itself. In addition, together with Definition
2 we know that these three concepts are equivalent: global information, a global representation, and first
order global information.
3.8 Motivaton of Definition 4 and 5
The motivation of these two definitions above can be explained from the viewpoint of trying to write a
function with two arguments (a, b) and a return value c. Suppose this function is defined as follows:
int c exampleFunction(int a, StringList b)
This example Function takes an integer and a list of strings as inputs and returns an integer value. It is
perfectly normal that the value of a will affect the behaviour of example Function, and a could also be a
return value from another function which take the same list of strings as input. This is an intuitive example
of Definition 4.
According to Definition 5 the return value of c is first order global information with respect to example
Function, there is no way that this value or any other function that takes this value as input could affect
example function’s behaviour that produced c, because it violates causality 9. However, in traditional
learning theory as being shown in Figure 2.3.1, the need for this information loop causes the spontaneous
issue. If we would like to construct a complex mapping relation by integrating many simple components,
then definitions 4 and 5 illustrate all possible relations among these components, they provide information
which would be either homology or ordered. Furthermore, as shown in this example, the return value c
means nothing to example Function, which means c must be an input of another function; otherwise, all
the hard work of example Function will be in vain. The function that takes c as an input value will be
referred to as the harvest function of example Function. Up to this stage, readers should have an intuitive
understanding of local and global relations, and these two issues of traditional learning theory also appear
in several intuitive examples in this chapter. Before we start the formal analysis of these two issues, the
author would like to summarise the basic assumptions of this dissertation briefly:
• There is no observation independent reality
• There is no “unknown pattern", the existence of different concepts is the result of learning, not the
other way around.
• As we are intuitively familiar, a model with learning ability could always define different concepts
according to different appearances, spontaneously.





The Laws of Learning
At the end of Chapter 2, two issues are raised from analysing the traditional learning theory In this section,
to simplify the expression, the term ’model’ will be used to replace the term ’hypothesis set’.
A model ML(D; Θ) : D → O is said to be a learning model that is able to learn from its domain D ( D
and O are high dimensional Euclidean space); it must follow these two laws.
4.1 Law 1
∀XS ⊂ D,∃θ,∃XN ⊂ D \XS : YS = ML(XS ; θ), YN = ML(XN ; θ), YN ∩ YS = ∅
For any subset XS of the domain D, there exists θ so that we can always find at least one such pair
< XN , YN = ML(XN ; θ) >, XN is disjoint with XS and YN is also disjoint with YS = ML(XS ; θ).
This law would be best understood by assuming that there is a model Mnon that does not obey law 1.
Then there will be four1 possible scenarios as follows:
Figure 4.1: Interpretation of Law One: Scenarios 1-3
In the three scenarios in Figure 4.1, XS and XN contain different local representations; however the
model Mnon will map them to the same set of global representation. Therefore, as a detector, Mnon fails
to detect different concepts in the domain. In other words, models that do not obey Law 1 are basically
1Scenarios two and three are equivalent.
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information black holes, which could allow possible information of the existence of many concepts to
devolve into the same state [25, p.43]. This expression might seem vague at first glance; however recall
the intuitive examples at the beginning of Chapter 3, reading the files with unexpected extensions that all
lead to the same error message. There is no way to tell all their differences from the error message; it is
the same for the counter event issue of the traditional learning theory, as shown in the example at the end
of Chapter 2. The Hegelian dialectic events happened only on expected classes; therefore we could say
that a typical classifier is remembering what being expect to remember in the training set in a fancy way.
Figure 4.2: Interpretation of Law One: Scenarios 4
What if YS and YN are partially overlap as shown in Figure 4.2? We could assume that YS is subject to
constraint CS and YN is subject to constraint CN , so that the differences contained in local representation
XS and XN can be preserved. However, adopting unique constraint indicates that we need to apply a
certain constraint on a unique event before the uniqueness of this event is actually being defined. In other
words, the model need information IU about the uniqueness of input set to make the decision about when
it should apply what constraint to the output set, which means in this scenario the model cannot define the
uniqueness of an input set spontaneously.
In summary, Law 1 guarantees that the possible existence of a new concept will not be missed.
4.2 Law 2
The training process2 of ML(α ⊂ Λ) : D → O should not depend on any of ML’s first order global
information MH which follows Law 1 and Law 2 as well. The intuitive explanation of law 2 is that a
learning model should be able to define the existence of a new concept all by itself. Here is an example:
2The notation Λ represents the parameter space of a model ML.
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The second issue is about learning spontaneously. The number of categories being contained in a domain
is first order global information, and the exampleFunction example at the end of Chapter 3 also indicates
that include any first order global information will violate causality.
Definition 2 ends all similar arguments, such as ’Should a NLP system linked with a dictionary be labelled
as ’Intelligence’?’. Furthermore, together with Law 1, models can be classified into two categories,
learning model and non-learning model (memory system), so that further analysis could be possible.
Readers have noticed that in the example at the beginning of Chapter 3, hard coded and tight coupling
always limit the generalisation ability of an application, in other words, to make an application behaves
smartly, we need to reduce the use of hard coded information and decouple, so the same for reducing the
use of global information for good generalization ability.
4.3 Corollary 1
Given a model ML : D → O(O ⊂ Rn, D ⊂ Rm), if ML follows Law 1, then there exists a family
of functions H : Rm → R which can be used to harvest information contained in the range of ML.
As shown in Definitions 4 and 5, elements in the range as first order global information are the products
of a model which is also beyond the vision of a model itself. Therefore, all that global information can
only be identified as local information which will be processed by other higher level mapping relations, it
is just like the return value of a function, if not assigned to some variable, this return value will be lost.
Therefore, the author chose to use the term ’harvest’ to express this operation. Rice would not appear in
you mouth automatically whenever you are hungry, it must be harvested from the field first.
4.3.1 Lemma 1
For a given D ⊂ Rn, ∀Xj ⊂ D and ∀r ∈ R, ∃Φ(x;x ∈ Xj) = r.
For any subset Xj of a n-dimensional real number in domain D and any given real number r, there exists
an equality constraint Φ(x), so that Φ(x;x ∈ Xj) = r.
Proof:
For a given subset Xj ⊂ D, there exists an equation3:
G(t) = (t− x1) • (t− x2) • ... • (t− xi) (4.1)
so that for any x ∈ Xj , we have G(x) = 0.
And for a given real number r, there exists:
Φ(t) = G(t) + r (4.2)
so that for any x ∈ Xj , we have Φ(x) = r.
Lemma 1 shows that for a given subset Xj of a n-dimensional real number space4, there exists a family of
equality constraints: ΦXj(t, r;Xj), so that ∀x ∈ Xj and ∀r ∈ R we have ΦrXj(x; r,Xj) = r.
3Solutions of this equation could be not an element of Xj ; this equation ’G(t)’ is just an example which proves the existence
of an equality constraint Φ.
4Currently, we assume that this is a discrete finite subspace of the continuous real number space.
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The constraint family ΦXj(t, r;Xj) can also be expressed as a column that includes infinitely many
constraints, as shown in Figure 4.3.
Figure 4.3: A family of constraints defined by Xj
Furthermore, constraint family Φ(t, r,Xk) is defined by the power set of the domain D (∀Xk ∈ P(D)),
and each member of this family is ΦrXk(x) = r and the constraint family Φ(t, r,Xk) can also be expressed
wit a matrix as shown in Figure 4.4.
Figure 4.4: Constraint families defined by powerset of D
Proof of Corollary 1
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It is known that model ML : D → O(O ⊂ Rn, D ⊂ Rm) satisfies Law 1, so that for
possible learning result Y1 there exists an equality constraint Φr1Y1 , and for a new learning
result Y2, there exists infinetly many equality constraints Φ
r26=r1
Y2
, so for a new learning result
Yi, there always exists an equality constraint ΦriYi which is defined by Yi and a real number ri
(ri 6= r1, ri 6= r2). Then the constraint in which all possible learning results can be expressed
is shown in Figure 4.5.
Figure 4.5: Information harvesting function H
Because Y1,Y2, to Yi are disjoint sets(Law 1) and the corresponding formula ΦriYI (y) equals a
unique real number, H(y) is by definition a function. There could be infinite possible H(y).
Thus, H is the harvesting function that can harvest information from a mapping relation,
which follows lLaw 1.
4.4 Corollary 2
The composition of mapping relations ML that follows Law 1 and its corresponding harvesting
function H still follows Law 1.
Proof:
Denote Fl = H ◦ML.
Because ML follows Law 1then:
∀XS ⊂ D,∃XN ⊂ D \XS
so that YS = ML(XS), YN = ML(XN ) and YN ∩ YS = φ
Then according to the definition of (H):
H(y; y ∈ YS) 6= H(y; y ∈ YN ).
Therefore, we know ∀XS ⊂ D,∃XN ⊂ D \XS :
FL(XS) 6= FL(XN )




The composition of mapping relations ML and any of its harvesting function H is equivalent to a
common constraint VC and a model ’L’ which also satisfies Law 1.
Figure 4.6: Common constraint VC and common learning model L. The constraint VC is independent
from any prior knowledge about R, in other words it does not depend on any sort of first order global
information of FL.
Proof:
Real numbers can be represented by parallel hyperplanes defined by a vector set VC . Because
of corollary 2 we know:
∀XS ⊂ D,∃XN ⊂ D \XS : FL(XS) 6= FL(XN ) (Corollary 2)
Therefore, L(XS) ∩ L(XN ) = φ (satisfies Law 1)
This corollary carries double meaning:
1. Linear separability is the common constraint for all models that could convert to that satisfy Law 1.
2. Without the harvesting function, the learning result of model ML cannot be recognised, so the
model FL (as shown in Figure 4.6) is supposed to be the mapping relation that could eventually
provide useful information. However, in spite of the existence of infinitely many possible H , it is
almost impossible to locate a suitable harvesting function without violating Law 2. Corollary 3
shows that VC is independent of any first order global information of FL (prior knowledge about
the undetected concepts)5. Therefore it has so far been the only known family of implementable
5It is a common sense that intelligent creatures are able to learn concepts from completely unfamiliar environment.
36
harvesting functions6 and it cooperates only with model ’L’. This corollary also explains researchers’
intuitive preference for linear separability.
4.6 The point of corollary two and three
As shown in figure 4.6 two subsets in space Rn could tightly entangled with each other, corollary two and
three proves that any two subset of Rn could have corresponding set of global representations which are
parallel to each other. Thus, the behaviour of the common learning model L is variance reduction.
Figure 4.7: Variance reduction of common learning model L
By expressing each point in a high-dimensional space, as shown in Figure 4.7, with a periodic function:
fX(t) = x1/
√
2 + x2 sin t+ x3 cos t+ x4 sin 2t+ x5 cos 2t... (4.3)
Function fX(t) is plotted on the range −pi < t < pi, and X is a high dimensional point[26]. Therefore, L
could be seen as a transformation of functions, and the behaviour of L can be expressed as being shown in
Figure 4.8.
6VC is a set of vectors.
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Figure 4.8: Variance reduction of common learning model L expressed as family of functions.
Two set of points as shown in Figure 4.8, will be expressed as two sets of functions (Black and Purple),
after being transformed, each set of functions will cluster to each other at some value t1. One important
work is to solve L by adopting the notion of harmonic analysis7. Because of the hierarchical structure of
global and local relation, repeat the transformation L, differences within each family of functions can be
defined at higher level, as shown in figure 4.9.
7This work has been stopped since last year this time.
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Figure 4.9: L1 and L2 are the same model, because this hierarchical structure. They could defined
different concept with different level of grain.
This mechanism solve author’s question (this question is proposed in the original PhD research proposal)
about the relation between learning to identify different races and learning to identify different individuals
of the same race. For example, global representations of two races are parallel to each other at the
hyperplane defined by t1, global representations of two individuals of the purple category will parallel to
each other at the hyperplane defined by t2.
The behaviour of a common learning model L is variance reduction (single algorithm hypothesis), because
of the hierarchical structure and the different property of different input space, different information will
be learned (Definition 3, modular mind hypothesis. and by keep extending this hierarchical structure
different grain of concept could be defined (scalable cortex hypothesis).
4.7 Explanatory Comment
This section explains the context of the two laws and three corollaries above in order to be understood. To
understand the essence of these laws and corollaries, it is necessary to understand what information can
and cannot be gained and what cannot from the viewpoint of a model rather than as a creator of a model.
1. Since the existences of concepts are defined based on different appearances, the notion of ’right’ or
’wrong’ is redundant in this situation. More precisely, for a learning model ML : D → O talking
about whether the model x → y(x ∈ X ⊂ D; y ∈ Y = M(x)) is correct or not is meaningless;
in other words, any criteria that can be used to test this model only provides first order global
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information with respect to ML. For example, when explaining the object recognition problem
using the theoretical framework proposed in this dissertation, two seemingly counter-intuitive
deductions are dataset separation and dataset merge problems.
• Dataset separation problem: When a dataset generated by one object is separated, there could
be two different sets of invariant representations, such as A and B in Figure 4.10.
• Dataset merge problem: When two datasets of different objects are merged together, there
could be a new set of invariant representations, such as C and D in Figure 4.10.
Figure 4.10: Dataset separate and merge problems
The above description is the common intuitive understanding of these two problems, but there are
two mistakes concerning this understanding:
• The two concepts are defined by the model, so these two problems are equivalent.
• Since there is no observation independent concept, solely discussing the existence of a certain
concept is meaningless and the example shown in Figure 4.10 is often known as an over-fitting
problem in the field of machine learning. However, from the viewpoint of a learning model
there is no notion of ’right’ or ’wrong’; therefore it is not a problem. It is a phenomenon
that can be used to verify the validity of future implementations based on this theoretical
framework. This phenomenon has also been proved by neuroscientists[27].
2. Law 1, together with Corollary 3 indicate that harvest function VC could utilise global represen-
tations for all possible concepts without the existence of L. This implication seems irrational at
first glance; however by assuming the well accepted learning model (human) is a learning model as
described in Corollary 3 (VC ◦L), the correctness of this implication is undeniable. This implication
is equivalent to:
People can see everything they could possible see in the future.
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Most people do not realise this fact in their daily lives, but this is the foundation of creative activities
such as painting or sculpture 8. It is not hard to image that a painter would still be able to create a
masterpiece once he/she lost his/her sight, and for normal people who do not master this painting
skill the experience of dreaming of strange-looking creatures is not unusual. In this case, when VC
and L were being constructed, all dimensions of the domain contain same type of information and
the appearances of a concept are fairly straightforwardly provided. What if the domain consists of
different types of information? We know that people who merely remember the answers of a certain
examination or all past examinations will not be acknowledged as having learned the concept of the
corresponding subject. On the other hand, people who learned concepts of a certain subject could
not only give answers to every possible related question but also see facts that cannot be seen by
people who merely remember the answers. This is an example of a non-learning model(memory
system) and learning model that are related to a high-level concept. In this case a high-level
concept will be defined based on different types of information and apparently how different types
of information being clustered will largely affect whether higher level concept can be effectively
learned or not9. This belongs to the discussion of intelligence which is beyond the scope of this
dissertation.
3. For model ML : D → O, (D ⊂ Rm, O ⊂ Rn), m, n and the range of each dimension are assumed
to be a very large number, to infinity ideally . The reason for this assumption is straightforward.
It is apparent that a domain D ⊂ R3 is less likely to contain less information than only two of
its recorded dimensions, and it is also less likely to contain less information than only the integer
part of all recorded dimensions. The direct consequence of having a domain which contains only
a small amount of information is that there will be not be enough information to define different
concepts. An intuitive example of this scenario would be when a person with a high degree of
myopia accidentally loses his/her glasses. Since the domain is supposed to be big enough to carry
large amounts of information, it is reasonable to assume that the dimensionality of the range is
high enough to contain enough parallel hyperplanes, and the range of each dimensionality seems
unimportant at this stage, but it is directly related to the further analysis of the model L. It is
worth mentioning that shrinking the range of each dimensionality is clearly a strategy that enable a
non-learning model which does not satisfy Law 1 behaves like it is able to learn the domain.
Up to this stage a summary that explains relations in each chapter of this dissertation will be given, so that
readers would have a better understanding of this dissertation.
First, by giving definitions of local and global information (representations), the intuitive understanding
of the relation between global and local can be explained in the framework of mapping relation. Based on
this formalised expression of information, Law 1 indicates that for a mapping relation to be a learning
model, it should at least not be an information black-hole. Law 2 confines possible information used in
constructing the so that from a s point of view it will not be able to utilise information that goes beyond
its field of vision (first order global information). Corollary 1 proves the existence of a set of equivalent
constraints which can harvest global information from a learning model, Additionally, all possible sets
of equivalent constraints are functions. Corollary 2 proves a learning model ML, together with any of
8The dynamic property of a model is out of scope here.
9Examples about high level concepts are provided at the beginning of chapter 3, such as learning the meaning of a word.
41
its possible harvest function H still satisfies Law 1 and different concepts of any type of information
ML can be represented by different real numbers although there are infinitly many possible choices and
it could be impossible to find any of them. Corollary 3 proves it is possible to have a harvest function
VC that is independent from any possible first order global information and all learning model ML has a
corresponding family of mapping relation L that are also learning models.
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CHAPTER 5
Conclusion and Future Works
Recently, the success of the Go-playing program Alpha-Go has surprised the public. People started
comparing its learning ability with top level Go players. However, necessary information used to construct
Alphago represents fundamental differences between a tradition learning model and a real learning model
(us). Assuming we double the size of a Go board, would any one still claim that Alphago has actually
’learned’ how to play Go? There size of a Go board is first order global information with respect to every
position of the board, and unlike Alphago, what human learned about GO would not be affected very
much by simply changing the size of the board.
Without a fundamental interpretation regarding what a given ability is, there could be dramatic differences
between constructing a near-this-ability-performance system and constructing a having-this-ability-
performance system. This dissertation gives two laws, which are necessary conditions for a model to be
acknowledged to have learning ability (to be a learning model). This dissertation also illustrates these
following facts:
• “Learning" is the ability of identifying the existence of a new concept.
• A model ML will be acknowledged as a learning model of information ML only when it is able to
possess this “learning" ability with no help from other learning models. In other words, being able
to learn spontaneously.
• If the mathematical expression (model) of our hypothesis of observation is not constructed carefully,
information provided by us (the creator of the model) can exceed the vision of the model very easily
and cause the model to be a non-learning model. Therefore, further development based on this
model for achieving a human-level learning ability can only lead to inevitable failure. For example,
using labels to represent our observations in typical classification problems will directly lead the
hypothesises of observation to fail to satisfy Law 2 and 1.
• There exists a common learning model that utilises the power of hyperplanes.
• The behaviour of a common learning model is variance reduction.
By inspecting from the viewpoint of mapping relations and treating them equally (human, animal, and
apparatus), these key ideas of this dissertation can be appreciated more clearly.
This dissertation, as the primary version of the first part of my original PhD thesis, brings more questions
than it has addressed. The following two parts include a discussion about the model L(x,Θ) and how the
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parameters change dynamically. Further illustration and explanation on these two issues will address the
following questions:
• Under what circumstances is the hierarchy structure1 of a learning model necessary?
• In a typical machine learning problem, the learning result is a θ ∈ Θ, however, for a learning model,
compared with obtaining desirable θ, a more valuable question is “how a learning model encodes
the unknown constraint of local representations of all concepts in the domain?".
• How could the possible existence of concepts depend on the information being contained in the
domain quantitatively?
• The dependency relation between learning model and non-learning model (memory system).
• How could harmonic analysis be used to solve (to get L) the transformation being discussed in
Chapter 4 ?
These days, swing into the saddle does not mean people are going on a long journey; jogging on the
pavement is usually just for exercise. After the industrial revolution, people have continued inventing all
different kinds of machines that enable us to exceed the physical limitations of our biological blueprint.
Therefore, the ability of invention, or more broadly, intelligence is the proudest property of human and it
has not been simulated by any man-made machine successfully, yet. This dissertation is one of the many
steps to the inevitable future when humans might not be an absolutely necessary information resource for
automatic systems and we could harvest knowledge that cannot be provided by our learning ability.
1Currently, there is no explanation of the necessity of having layer structure for both biological and artificial neural networks.
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